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The Information Content of Directors' Trades: Empirical analysis of the Australian Market

Introduction:
Insider trading has been regulated in Australia under various Securities Industry Acts since 1970 and is an offence in the majority of the world's capital markets. Whilst insider trading typically has a negative connotation associated with it, this study does not attempt to give credence to whether insider trading is harmful, nor whether it should or should not be regulated. Rather, the purpose is much simpler. We examine whether insider trading is prevalent in the market, given the current regulatory structure in which it is prohibited. Thus, there are important public policy implications. It may indicate whether directors appear to blatantly disregard the law and whether the current regulatory structure is effective.
Well-known economist and Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman (2003) aptly described this argument in his statement "You want more insider trading, not less. You want to give the people most likely to have knowledge about deficiencies of the company an incentive to make the public aware of that". According to this reasoning, corporate collapses such as HIH and Enron would have been brought to the public's attention much sooner. Manne (1966) argues that allowing insider trading is an effective means of compensating corporate agents for innovations. The entrepreneur can purchase the firm's shares before the innovation is announced to the market and sell the shares after the resultant price increase. This forms an effective compensation scheme whereby the compensation is directly linked to the value of the innovation to the firm. Carlton and Fischel (1983) cite that this method is more effective than constant renegotiation of fixed contracts and allows the individual to tailor the compensation to the information he or she produces. As a result, this further increases the entrepreneur's incentive to develop more valuable innovations. Society and the firm benefit through the additional information produced that is of value to the firm.
Numerous studies in the US have examined corporate insider trading, primarily because of the availability of data. Despite the extensive data pertaining to the US, a number of questions remain unresolved. Additionally, insider trading literature in regards to Australia is scarce because of its slow adoption of disclosure requirements and thus there is an apparent lack of data needed to conduct research. Although data are now available, the literature is still scanty. This provides the basis for our research, especially considering that directors are likely to be in possession of the most inside information.
We attempt to contribute to the some unresolved issues and to the lack of empirical research pertaining to Australia. We use directors' trading as a proxy for corporate insider information. Directors as corporate insiders have an intimate knowledge of the workings of a firm and have timely access to financial performance figures.
Considering this as a back drop their predictability of the company's performance and the stock market response appears to be better at least in short term.
If directors' trades do contain information, then according to the semi-strong form of market efficiency, when the trade becomes public knowledge, this should be reflected in the share price. Outsiders should not be able to make abnormal profits from trading on this information. Seyhun (1986) , and Rozeff and Zaman (1988) found results consistent with the semi-strong form of market efficiency. Net of transaction costs, outsiders do not benefit from imitating directors.
More recently, however, and using a sample of trades with a relatively shorter delay between trade and disclosure, Bettis, Vickrey and Vickrey (1997) found that both insiders and outsiders can earn abnormal profits, net of transaction costs in the short and long-term. This study has important market efficiency implications. If, as suggested, investors are able to earn abnormal profits from publicly available information, the market is not semi-strong form efficient. Lorie and Neiderhoffer (1968) , Jaffe (1976) and Finnerty (1976) , among others, all adopt an intensive trading criterion and conclude that insiders in the U.S. do earn significant abnormal returns by trading on the securities of their own firms. Jaffe (1976 p.428.) , in particular, asserts that the occurrence of profitable insider transactions implies that "trading on inside information is widespread" and "insiders actually do violate security regulations". Whilst these studies generally indicate that insiders do profit from trading when in possession of non-public information, the studies do not attempt to identify who trades on the inside information. This may partly be overcome with the disclosure of directors' trades. Finnerty (1976) has found that insiders earn above average returns when they buy securities of their respective organizations. On the sell side, his results indicated that the securities the insiders were selling fell more than the general market decline of the same period. From his study, it is apparent that in the short-run insiders are able to identify profitable as well as loss avoidable situations in their own companies.
Literature Review
Rogoff (1964) examined 45 companies in which, within a single month, three or more insiders buy their company's stock and no insiders sell the stock. He found that the returns to the insiders of these companies in the following 6 months were on average 9.5% higher than the return to the stock market as a whole. Jaffe (1974) tested the information content of the 'Official Summary of Security Transactions and Holdings' of U.S., Securities and Exchange Commission. He has found that insiders do possess special information. However, after adjustment for transaction cost, only the intensive trading samples with 8-month holding periods were earning statistically large returns. King and Roell (1988) found that a buy portfolio replicating 109 insider purchases produced an abnormal return of 2.47% after one month, and 53% after twelve months.
The sell portfolio of 269 insider sales produced a 1.18% and 7.6% abnormal return respectively. Gregory et al (1994) documented abnormal returns following insiders' trades. They further showed that a large proportion of these abnormal returns occurred in small and medium sized firms. Cheuk, Fan and So (2006) examined the characteristics and price movements of legal insider transactions in Hong Kong. As per their findings, Hong Kong insiders can make abnormal profits from both buying and selling activities. The magnitude of these abnormal profits associated with insider sales is considerably larger than that associated with insider purchases.
In an another study, Hillier and Marshall (2002) examined the abnormal share price returns of director trading, and report that on average directors outperformed the market and seemed to time their trade perfectly. Further, there was evidence that after above average performance, directors sold their shares in unison. Pope et al (1990) using a slightly larger sample of 275 buy and 289 sell signals over the period 1977-84 found that for up to six months after the signal there were significant abnormal returns of 4.85% for the whole sample. When split into buy and sell signals, the sells were significantly negative, but the buys, though positive were not significant.
Some of the studies on insider trading has undertaken on the basis of private information. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) provide evidence of excess returns earned prior to the first public disclosure of merger announcements. They cite that systematic abnormal returns can be interpreted as prima facie evidence of the market's reaction to information in advance of its public announcement. Similar findings have been observed in the lead up to dividend announcements (John and Lang, 1991) , share repurchases (Lee, Mikkelson et al., 1992) , earnings announcements (Park, Jang et al., 1995) , and takeovers (Meulbroek, 1992) . Agarwal and Singh (2006) tested the insider trading prior to merger announcement in a developing economy, i.e. India and found existence of possible insider trading prior to merger announcements. Tomasic (1991) interviewed key players of Australia in the finance industry including brokers, lawyers, merchant bankers, financial journalists, and officers, among others, who offered their perceptions of the incidence of insider trading. He found that insider trading occurs predominantly in small speculative stocks and is likely to be undertaken by directors. He also contends that illegal insider trading is likely to occur in the market for shares rather than options.
1 Brown and Foo (1997) and Anand, Brown and Watson (2002) find that directors' selling transactions, not purchase transactions, are associated with abnormal returns.
We extend on Brown and Foo's (1997) Transactions were removed from the sample if (i) more than one transaction type was stated in the change of director's interest notice, but the number of shares was indistinguishable between the two types, (ii) the trade involved an amendment in subsequent disclosures and (iii) the trade specifically disclosed the reason for the change in holdings. In cases where no date of change was reported, the date of change was taken to be the date of disclosure. Trades that extended over a period of time but
were not disclosed separately were recorded as at the date of the first transaction.
To avoid double counting, where two or more trades by different directors involved the same parcel of indirectly held shares, all but one of the transactions were removed from the sample. That is, where two or more directors of the same company reported a change in holdings of the same amount on the same day, the nature of the interests was examined. If the nature of the interest was indirect for both directors, only one of the transactions was retained. Similarly, multiple trades on the same day by the same director of the same company were combined together to form a total change in holdings.
Given that not all directors' trades are based on inside information, only on market transactions were included in the sample. Therefore, following types of trades; off market trades, dividend reinvestment schemes, conversions of options, share purchase plans and rights issues were removed from the sample. Likewise, to reduce the potential for including trades for reasons such as diversification or taxation, an intensive trading criterion was imposed. If a company's stock exhibits intensive trading in the same direction by directors, it is likely that the trades are information motivated. In order to be included, it was required that over the given sample period, four or more directors buy (sell) shares and no director takes an opposing action 4 .
This requirement is consistent with previous empirical research conducted by Lorie and Neiderhoffer (1968) and Jaffe (1976) .
A survivorship criterion was imposed to only include companies that had available share price and volume data for the 160 days before and after the date of trade.
Companies were also removed from the sample if they were suspended from trading at any time during the sample period. This was determined by examining the volume and price data for each firm. If a company experienced an unusual period of zero returns and volume their company announcements were examined to determine if this was due to a trading halt. 5 No adjustments have been made to account for thin trading and thus it may be a problem affecting many of the companies, especially in the case of smaller sub sample. 
Research Methodology:
Abnormal Return
The stock price behaviour surrounding directors' trades was examined using an event study method where the date of interest was the date of director's trade. To avoid misspecification arising from overlapping event periods, the sample was further reduced. Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) cite the only way to overcome this problem is to purge the observations of overlapping returns. Thus, of the companies that experienced intensive trading, only one trade was selected in order to calculate profitability of possible insider trading. Selection was based on the trade of greatest volume and the date of change, so as to capture the date of the other trades in the surrounding event window.
There is difficulty involved in detecting insider trading, both in the market place and by individual directors. Thus, the presence of insider trading may be inferred from the existence of abnormal returns -a practice that is generally accepted in the finance literature (Keown and Pinkerton 1981) . The calculation of abnormal returns requires the use of a benchmark in order to isolate the unusual performance of a specific asset by comparing the expected returns with actual returns.
1
For each of the securities, daily rates of return were calculated:
= return of security i on day t R i,t P i,t and P are the adjusted closing price for security i on day t and t-1 respectively. i,t-1 Rozeff and Zaman (1988) indicate that firm size affects the abnormal returns from insider trading and must be considered when selecting an appropriate model. Dimson and Marsh (1986) propose that the size effect can be overcome by constructing a set of diversified control portfolios for companies in different capitalisation classes. This method is preferable to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or a market model because it specifically accounts for firm size and is non-parametric in its approach.
The use of this method is also consistent with Lin and Howe (1990) .
Where:
We concentrate on daily rates of return rather than monthly because it facilitates a closer scrutiny of the impact of insider trading. Where;
Historical market capitalisation data was unavailable for the event period windows. Pre-trade returns were examined because they can give significant insight into the reasons why directors trade and their ability to time the market. 
Abnormal Volume
In the market microstructure literature, high trading volumes are associated with the release and reception of information. Abnormal volume was calculated in a similar way to abnormal return and requires the use of a benchmark. Gao and Oler (2004) propose a method of calculating abnormal volume that accounts for firm specific (time series) and market wide (cross-sectional) factors:
Where; 
Empirical Results
Abnormal Return
Timing of Directors' Trades
Stock price behaviour surrounding directors' trades is displayed for both purchases and sales in Figure 1 for the 160 days before and after the date of trade. From this, it can be seen that not only do directors earn abnormal returns from their trades, but also on average time their trades nearly to perfection. The graph exhibits a price reversal effect; sales occur after a period of good performance and purchases occur after a period of poor performance, at which time the trend is reversed. From approximately 80 days before through to the day of the transaction, abnormal returns on purchases of directors' firms on average under perform the constructed portfolio. On the day of the buy transaction the abnormal returns on shares of the directors' companies begin to move upwards. Can we say that directors have an idea before hand that prices are going to go north? Basel and Stein (1979) has given reason that purchases are more often driven by information or profit motive. It seems it is not so easy to establish.
Sale transactions generally exhibit the opposite pattern. Whilst the results for all trades appear to be straightforward, when stratified according to size and can be seen in Figures 2 to 4 . Medium, small and large companies all exhibit a price reversal effect for sales, where it is apparent that directors time their trades and earn substantial abnormal returns, with varying degrees of profitability. 
Profitability in 160day Pre-and Post-trade Period
Directors may earn abnormal returns if stock prices rise abnormally after their purchase trades or if stock prices decline abnormally after their sales. Negative posttrade profits of directors' sales are taken to be profits to directors in the sense that relative losses are avoided. When all trades are combined, in 
Profitability in 90 day Pre-and Post-trade Period
Similar findings can be observed in Figure 5 over the 90-day period before and after the date of the director's trade. Similar to the 160-day findings, sales exhibit a price reversal, as do purchases, except for trades by directors of large companies. The profitability of trades over this shorter horizon, as shown in Table 3 Lee (2001) highlighted that this segment of the market is often perceived to be less efficient. Sales trades' results indicate that bad news is incorporated into prices much sooner than good news.
Profitability in Short-Term
Directors' trades have little explanatory power in predicting returns over a short horizon such as one month, suggesting that directors are not likely to be day traders or fly by night operators. Profitability of purchase trades in the short term i.e. over the following twenty days; do not appear to be statistically significant for any trades, except of medium companies, which have a cumulative abnormal return of 2.95% as shown in Table 4 . CAR is (4.16) in the case of large companies in post 20 days window, which represent the loss avoiding trades. Post 20 days sales trades are exception for the small sub sample. The finding that directors' trades are profitable in the long run but not over a short horizon is again consistent with studies conducted in the United States [Givoly and Palmon (1985) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) ]. It is important to note that trading regulations differ between the two countries. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States prohibits insiders from profiting on round-trip trades completed within a six-month period. Any profits made from such a transaction must be disgorged and returned to the corporation 4 . No such regulation exists in Australia. One possible reason for this observation could be that directors are still wary about their legal obligations. If they were to trade based on a forthcoming event, this may subject them to unwanted scrutiny by ASIC. The presence of abnormal returns over a relatively longer time horizon and not over the short term also suggests that directors are not enticed to trade based on the forthcoming disclosure of a specific event (Givoly and Palmon, 1985) .
Overall, only purchases by directors of small companies show any significant abnormal return. Sales, on the other hand are profitable by directors of all companies.
Whilst purchases by directors of medium companies are not profitable, they are timed to avoid significant negative abnormal returns and could be an indication that the period of poor performance has ended.
Mimicking Trades by Outsiders
Given that directors do generally earn abnormal returns and time their trades, their trading contains a certain degree of information regarding the future long-term performance of the firm. Therefore, it would be expected that when the director discloses the change in their interest, this would be fully incorporated into share prices on the day of disclosure. So, as per semi-strong efficient market hypothesis, outsiders
should not be able to mimic the trading patterns and earn any abnormal returns on this publicly available information. Specifically examining the abnormal returns earned in the post-disclosure period has tested this, the results of which can be seen in Table 5 . It is apparent that in purchase trades, except of directors of small companies none other has much abnormal return in a period up to 90 days. The information contained in directors' trades should be reflected in the share price up to five trading days after the change in holdings, as required by law. Not all directors disclose their trades within this time period. 1 The average time between date of change and date of disclosure is approximately five calendar days for all trades and does not differ according to firm size, assuming that on average directors do conform to their reporting requirements. Accordingly, for our sample, abnormal returns should not be evident starting five days after the date of the director's change in holdings.
Outsiders mimicking the trading patterns of directors can still earn significant abnormal returns up to 11.4% (sales trade) in the 160-day post-announcement period.
In case of large companies it is as high as 16.4%. For sales, in order to mimic the trade the outsider must already own shares in the company. Alternatively, this could be interpreted as a signal of when not to purchase shares. Short selling is not a viable strategy for mimicking directors' sales, in that a short position must be settled within three days; however trades are only profitable over a relatively longer period of time.
The finding that abnormal returns are predictable to some extent has important market efficiency implications and suggests that the market is not efficient in the semi-strong form; abnormal returns can be earned by trading on publicly available information at least in the case of small companies.
Abnormal Volume
As previously mentioned, abnormal volume provides further insight into the dissemination of directors' trades into the market and the trading patterns of both directors and outsiders. If outsiders follow the disclosure of directors' trades, it would be expected that volume would substantially increase on the day of disclosure. If this were the case, it would seem that outsiders do pay attention to the trading patterns of directors and they consider that directors' trades convey a certain degree of information.
The abnormal volume is displayed in Table 6 for the 160 days before and after the date of trade. Panel A of Table 5 indicates that abnormal volume for directors' purchases on average increase substantially on the day before and the day after the date of trade. Panel B of Table 5 indicates that abnormal volume increases substantially on the day before the director's sale through to the day after the trade.
Apart from transactions by directors of large companies this is consistent when stratified according to company size, although reason for this finding is unclear.
6. Average Abnormal Volume -All Trades An alternative explanation is that directors try to mask their trades by trading when the market is noisy and other uninformed investors are driving up volume. If private information becomes disseminated it loses its value to the informed agent. Therefore, in the process of trading, the informed strive to maintain privacy of their information, although this is only evident for purchase transactions.
The finding that volume substantially increases on the day of trade for sales but not purchases indicates that directors are more likely to purchase shares in smaller denominations than sales in an attempt to hide their trading. It also supports the theory that informed traders transmit information by trading large amounts, a finding consistent with the previous observation that directors' sales are more profitable than their purchases. Givoly and Palmon (1985) indicates that outsiders do not drive the abnormal volume in reaction to the trade because they are as yet unaware of the change in interest.
The apparent under reaction by investors in response to directors' trades could also be explained by the nature of the disclosure. (Daniel, Hirshleifer et al., 2002) note that in providing information to investors, relevant information must be salient and easily processed; the form as well as the content is important and affects how well the information is absorbed. Investors may find the disclosure of directors' trades difficult to interpret. Not all trades are based on inside information and thus, investors must be able to discern the difference between trades in order to effectively mimic them promptly. This is especially likely to be the case in our study. Literature in Australia regarding effective trading strategies based on directors' trades is scarce, as are commercialised services that explicitly sell and interpret insider trading data.
Investors may not know which trades to mimic and even whether this presents a profitable strategy.
It is also evident however, that volume significantly increases on the day of average disclosure for sales. This is noteworthy because it signifies that outsiders do pay attention to the trading of directors and mimic their trading. It appears however, that even though outsiders recognise that directors' trades convey information, this is not fully incorporated into prices.
Interest in Sales versus Purchases
The observation that sales are generally more profitable than purchases is not new; however, the reason has previously never been explored. The studies by Foo (1997) & Givoly and Palmon (1985) observe this effect, however they do not provide an explanation extending beyond methodology limitations in the prior literature. The finding that purchases are more profitable than sales has an intuitive explanation.
Purchases are made for only one reason, to make a profit, whereas sales may be driven by other underlying factors such as taxation, diversification, liquidity etc.
Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory describes how individuals evaluate losses and gains in respect to a given reference point. They contend that losses create more distress among investors than the happiness created by equivalent gains. In regards to sales by directors, the loss aversion is not in relation to the foregone shares because they are traded as initially intended. Rather, the director is loss averse to the future loss of return that would occur if the director were to hold onto the shares. Given the same expected variation in returns, a director is more likely to trade based on negative information rather than equivalent positive information.
Loss aversion can also explain the descriptive statistics whereby average trade size differs depending on the type of trade. Directors' trades display more urgency when faced with the possibility of a real loss and therefore they will trade in larger amounts.
It is also apparent that outsiders are loss averse, as evident from the abnormal volume displayed in Table 5 . The substantial increase in volume on the day of disclosure for sales but not purchases indicates that outsiders are quick to update their beliefs in regards to potential losses, but they are slow to react to potential gains.
Conclusions
We examined the abnormal share price performance surrounding directors' trades of intensive trading firms. Consistent with the majority of other studies we report that directors of small and medium companies on average outperform the market and seem to time their trades perfectly. Directors of these companies have an uncanny ability to time the market by trading when mispricing is greatest, and are able to predict the short term future performance of their firms because of their exclusive position. Sales consistently exhibit a price reversal effect; positive abnormal returns are earned prior to the sale and negative returns after it. The results indicate that the securities the directors were selling fell more than the general portfolio of similar sized companies.
Directors' trades are profitable over the longer term i.e. in the following 90 or 160 days, rather than over a shorter horizon such as one month (20 days). Directors' trades do contain information regarding the future predictability of the firms' share price, especially in the case of directors of small companies. Outsiders recognise this and react to the disclosure of directors' sales, however the price is slow to adjust; abnormal returns exist well after the disclosure of the trade. Outsiders are able to profitably mimic the trading of directors' sales, and purchases made by directors of small companies.
The finding that both directors beat the market and that outsiders can develop implemental trading strategies based on this information contradicts much of traditional finance and the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Our results not only contradict the strong form of market efficiency in case of small companies but also the semi-strong form for most trades conducted in this study. We cannot discredit the Efficient Market Hypothesis completely. It is evident that outsiders do react to some information contained in directors' trades, especially for sales. Because of the difficulty involved in interpreting the disclosure made by a director however, investors are unable to discern the supposed information contained in directors'
trades. Thus, the information is not immediately fully incorporated into prices, but is eventually.
The policy implications of our findings are clear; directors do appear to disregard the law and the current regulatory environment doesn't seem to deter them. ASIC may want to pay closer scrutiny to the trading activities of directors of small and medium companies and take further action if necessary.
For future research, the most pressing need is to extend the sample size and the sample period. Thin trading is a problem affecting our sample which may introduces biases into the study. Like all other insider trading studies, our research does not provide any examination of instances of non-trading due to the possession of inside information. Nor does it provide evidence pertaining to trades by directors or other individuals privy to inside information, but which were not disclosed to the ASX. 4 Our study does include trades by immediate family members of directors, which were disclosed to the ASX.
